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Abstract The presuppositions inherited from the consequent of a conditional or
the second disjunct of a disjunction oscillate between a conditional and a non-
conditional inference, depending on the context. This is problematic for most
theories of presupposition projection in the literature, which only predict a condi-
tional presupposition for such sentences (Karttunen 1974; Stalnaker 1973; Heim
1983; Beaver 2001; Schlenker 2009; Fox 2008 among others). The general response
to this problem, the so-called ‘Proviso Problem’ (Geurts 1996), is to assume that
in addition to the basic conditional presupposition, a non-conditional inference can
arise depending on the relationship between the antecedent/first disjunct and the
presupposition of the consequent/second disjunct. We discuss data for which this
solution makes the wrong predictions. Similar data have been taken by van der
Sandt (1992), Geurts (1996) and Garcia-Odon (2012) to motivate the DRT-approach
to presuppositions. Schlenker (2011), however, has raised various arguments against
such an approach. We propose an alternative analysis, which doesn’t have those
problems. In our analysis, the differing presuppositions are the result of a systematic
ambiguity involving exhaustification in a trivalent semantics: a non-conditional
presupposition obtains with exhaustification, and a conditional one without. In-
dependently motivated plausibility considerations decide which reading is chosen
with no direct selection of presuppositions needed. We discuss how this approach
deals with the various cases of proviso and the predictions it makes for biconditional
sentences.
Keywords: presuppositions, presupposition projection, exhaustification, Proviso Problem
1 Introduction
The presuppositions inherited from the consequent of a conditional or the second
disjunct of a disjunction oscillate between a conditional and a non-conditional
inference, depending on the context; a phenomenon generally known as the ‘Proviso
Problem’ (Geurts 1996).1 To illustrate, consider the following examples in (1) and
* For helpful comments and suggestions, we would like to thank Emmanuel Chemla, Irene Heim, Matt
Mandelkern, Paolo Santorio, Philippe Schlenker, Yasu Sudo and the audiences at ZAS and SALT 26.
1 The problem was already discussed in Karttunen & Peters 1979 and Gazdar 1979 among others.
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(2), adapted from Pérez Carballo 2009.
(1) a. If John isn’t tired, he’ll read his Bible.
b. Either John is tired, or he’ll read his Bible.
c. 6 If John isn’t tired, he has a Bible
d. John has a Bible
(2) a. If John is Catholic, he’ll read his Bible.
b. Either John isn’t Catholic, or he’ll read his Bible.
c. If John is Catholic, he has a Bible
d. John has a Bible
The conditional and the disjunctive sentences in (1a) and (1b) intuitively suggest
that John has a Bible as in (1d).2 They do not suggest that if he isn’t tired then he
has a Bible as in (1c). However, the two sentences in (2a) and (2b) could be taken to
suggest the weaker conditional inference (2c) that John has a Bible if he is Catholic.3
Most theories of presuppositions in the literature predict that both (1) and (2)
should project the conditional presupposition in (1c) and (2c), which is problematic
at least for the case of (1) (Stalnaker 1973; Karttunen 1974; Heim 1983, 1990,
1992; Beaver 2001; Schlenker 2008, 2009; Fox 2008; George 2008; Rothschild
2011 among many others). However, a standard response to the Proviso Problem
compatible with these accounts is to argue that under certain conditions, the sentences
above can be associated with the stronger non-conditional presupposition in (1d)
and (2d) (Karttunen & Peters 1979; Beaver 2001; Heim 2006; Singh 2007, 2008;
von Fintel 2008; Schlenker 2011; Stalnaker 2014; Pérez Carballo 2009; Lassiter
2012; see also Mandelkern 2016b). The ‘certain conditions’ under which the non-
conditional presupposition arises differ across different accounts of Proviso; in all
accounts, however, they are such that the non-conditional presupposition arises
systematically in cases like (1) but only optionally − if ever − in cases like (2).
In the present paper, we argue that both the conditional and the non-conditional
inference directly correspond to different presuppositions of the sentences above and
whether a non-conditional presupposition obtains depends on whether the conditional
receives a ‘perfected’ interpretation4 or the disjunction is interpreted exclusively.
2 In the following  indicates an inference that a sentence is intuitively taken to have without a
commitment as to the nature of this inference.
3 In the literature, cases like (2) are sometimes characterized as only having the weak conditional
presupposition in (2c). Given the entailment relation from (2d) to (2c) which makes the latter always
true where the former is, we assume that the stronger inference in (2d) is also possible in absence of
evidence to the contrary (see Meyer & Sauerland 2009 among others).
4 ‘Perfected’ in the sense of Geis & Zwicky 1971; see also von Fintel 2001 and references therein.
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In other words, we align the conditional versus non-conditional presupposition
distinction with the strengthened versus non-strengthened meaning of the sentences
so that the two kinds of presuppositions observed are the consequence of genuine
truth-conditional ambiguity. In addition, we show that for sentences like those in
(1), unlike those in (2), the reading involving a conditional presupposition would go
against plausibility considerations and is therefore blocked for independent reasons.
The motivation for this account is both theoretical and empirical. First, we
note that accounts of presupposition projection like the trivalent Strong Kleene
approach (Peters 1979; Beaver & Krahmer 2001; Fox 2008; George 2008; Chemla
& Schlenker 2012 among others) and accounts based on incremental transparency
(Schlenker 2008, 2009) predict that biconditional sentences like (3a) should project
a non-conditional inference, unlike what they predict for simple conditionals. We
make the novel observation that this prediction is in fact borne out. For instance, the
biconditional (3a) seems to suggest that John has a Bible more strongly than (2a)
does.
(3) a. John is Catholic if and only if he will read his Bible tonight.
b. John has a Bible
Second, we argue that this difference between biconditionals and simple conditionals
is at the basis of a solution for problematic examples like those in (4) and (5)
(adapted from van der Sandt 1992; Geurts 1996; Garcia-Odon 2012; Katzir & Singh
2013). In (4a) and (5a) the antecedent strictly entails the presupposition of the
consequent, and in (4b) and (5b) it is the negation of the first disjunct that strictly
entails the presupposition of the second disjunct. The key point here is that (4a) and
(4b) intuitively can be read as having an inference that John went to Europe and
(5a) and (5b) that the speaker’s best student left.5 Existing accounts of the Proviso
Problem such as the ones mentioned above, however, predict the sentences to have
tautological conditional presuppositions and thus to be presuppositionless.
(4) a. If John is in Berlin, he is happy that he went to Europe.
b. Either John isn’t in Berlin or he’s happy he went to Europe.
c. If John is in Berlin, John went to Europe
d. John went to Europe
(5) a. If all students left, the janitor didn’t realize that my best student left.
b. Either not all students left or the janitor didn’t realize that my best student
left.
5 These types of examples go back to Soames 1979 and have been used as arguments against Gazdar’s
(1979) theory, because they have a reading associated with a weak, in fact tautological, conditional
presupposition which the latter account does not predict (see the discussion in Heim 1990).
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c. If all students left, my best student left
d. My best student left
In our analysis, the presence or absence of the inference in question is the result
of a systematic ambiguity between strengthening (perfection of the conditional or
exclusivity of the disjunction) and non-strengthening: a non-conditional inference
obtains with strengthening, and a conditional, tautological one without. Indepen-
dently motivated plausibility considerations decide which reading is chosen with no
direct selection of presuppositions needed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section2 discusses the Proviso
Problem in more detail and points out complications for existing accounts. Section3
introduces the new account. This account is couched in a Strong Kleene approach to
presupposition projection and covers the problematic cases mentioned. In Section4
the account is extended to further data connected to the Proviso Problem. Section5
concludes the paper.
2 The Proviso Problem
2.1 The Proviso Problem
Recall once more the examples from (1) and (2), repeated as (6) and (7) respectively.
Both sentences in (6) suggest that John has a Bible, while both sentences in (7) can
be taken to suggest that if John is Catholic he has a Bible.
(6) a. If John isn’t tired, he’ll read his Bible.
b. Either John is tired, or he’ll read his Bible.
c. 6 If John isn’t tired, he has a Bible
d. John has a Bible
(7) a. If John is Catholic, he’ll read his Bible.
b. Either John isn’t Catholic, or he’ll read his Bible.
c. If John is Catholic, he has a Bible
d. John has a Bible
Gazdar (1979) and Geurts (1996) take the fact that the sentences in (6) appear to
only be associated with the non-conditional presupposition in (6d) as problematic
for those theories of presupposition projection that instead predict the conditional
presupposition in (6c) for such sentences.6 The criticism is that an empirically
6 In Gazdar’s case the criticism was originally leveled at Karttunen & Peters’s (1979) multi-dimensional
description of presupposition projection patterns based in turn on Karttunen’s (1973) observations.
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adequate theory of presupposition projection should predict a non-conditional pre-
supposition for such examples. In response to this problem, one could hold that the
predicted conditional presupposition seems to be just fine once examples like those
in (7) are considered. The argument would go as follows: the predicted conditional
presupposition is adequate for both (6) and (7). It just so happens that a stronger
inference is sometimes associated with such cases (see Karttunen & Peters 1979;
Beaver 2001; Heim 2006; Singh 2007; van Rooij 2007; Singh 2008; von Fintel
2008; Schlenker 2011; Stalnaker 2014; Pérez Carballo 2009; Lassiter 2012 among
others). One implementation of this approach is based on accommodation (Heim
2006; von Fintel 2008; Beaver 2001 among others). If a sentence like the above is
uttered in a context which does not entail the conditional presupposition, the hearer
could choose to accommodate such a conditional presupposition or the stronger
non-conditional one (we will come back below to the conditions regulating this
choice). If the non-conditional presupposition is the one which gets accommodated,
the weaker conditional presupposition cannot be accessed by intuitions anymore.
2.2 The choice between conditional and non-conditional presuppositions
We will now discuss what seems to us to be a core feature of replies, such as the one
just sketched, to Gazdar’s (1979) and Geurts’s (1996) criticism.
As discussed, accounts of the Proviso Problem have to provide a solution to what
Schlenker (2011) calls the ‘selection problem.’ That is they have to spell out the
conditions under which a conditional sentence like the above is associated with a
non-conditional presupposition as opposed to a conditional one. While the details
vary across different accounts, they agree on the idea that the selection mechanism is
constrained by a notion of independence: if the antecedent (or the negation of the first
disjunct) is independent in some sense from the presupposition of the consequent (or
the second disjunct) the non-conditional presupposition will arise (von Fintel 2008;
van Rooij 2007; Singh 2008; Schlenker 2011; Pérez Carballo 2009; Lassiter 2012;
see also Mandelkern 2016b).
To get an intuitive grasp of how this predicts the right presupposition for sen-
tences like (6) and (7) above, let us discuss Lassiter’s (2012) account in a bit more
detail. Roughly, in this account, the non-conditional presupposition arises depending
on whether the truth of the presupposition of the consequent (or second disjunct) is
likely to be dependent on the truth of the antecedent (or negation of the first disjunct)
or whether it is more plausible to be independent of it. For instance, a hearer faced
with either the conditional or the disjunctive sentence in (6) will conclude that
John’s state of tiredness is independent of him having a Bible and will therefore
go for the non-conditional presupposition that John has a Bible. In the case of (7),
however, it is not implausible that John’s having a Bible is dependent on him being
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Catholic. For that reason, the conditional presupposition that John has a Bible, if he
is Catholic will arise. But in principle nothing prohibits the stronger non-conditional
presupposition to arise even in this case. That is, the examples in (7) can have both
types of presuppositions depending on the particular context.
2.3 Problematic data for existing accounts
In addition to the classical proviso data above, there are examples like those in
(4) and (5) above. As mentioned, the crucial feature of these examples is that the
antecedent or negation of the first disjunct strictly entails the presupposition of the
consequent or second disjunct. As also said, the examples appear to have a reading
with a clear unconditional inference that John went to Europe and that the speaker’s
best student left, respectively. Examples of that sort are not generally discussed when
dealing with the Proviso Problem (with the exception of van Rooij 2007 and Katzir &
Singh 2013). They, however, can be seen as parallel to examples like (7): the absence
of an inference is simply the result of a tautological, conditional presupposition,
which is the one predicted for the cases considered. The non-conditional inference,
on the other hand, corresponds to the stronger non-conditional presupposition. In
other words, there would be two candidate presuppositions: a tautological one and a
non-tautological one. The component of an account of the Proviso Problem dealing
with the ‘selection problem’ mentioned in the preceding section should therefore
select one of them depending on what is the more plausible inference.7
The problem is that all of the accounts mentioned only predict the conditional
presupposition. That is, they predict all the sentences in (4) and (5) to be presuppo-
sitionless. For instance, in Lassiter’s account the presupposition of the consequent
or second disjunct is necessarily dependent on the antecedent or negation of the first
disjunct. The reason for that is that the latter entails the former (e.g., all students left
entails that my best student left). That is, learning the truth of the antecedent (or the
negation of the first disjunct) changes the degree of belief in the presupposition of
the consequent (or second disjunct) given this entailment relation. Therefore, the
non-conditional presupposition is predicted to be unavailable, against intuitions.
A first response to this problem could be to argue that the non-conditional
inference in this case is not a presupposition of the sentence. However, tests targeting
the presuppositional status of an inference suggest that the non-conditional inference
7 It must be noted that accounts of the Proviso Problem relying on the assumption that accommodation
is only forced when the context does not entail the predicted sentence presupposition such as Heim’s
(2006) and Singh’s (2007) proposals do not allow for a stronger presupposition in (4) and (5). The
reason is that the sentence presupposition is tautological. Any context entails this presupposition.
Thus there is no need for accommodation and the stronger non-tautological presupposition cannot
surface. Of course, it then remains a mystery why the examples can be read with the stronger
inference at all. See the text for more discussion of this.
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in question is indeed presuppositional. For instance, the Hey wait a minute-test (von
Fintel 2008) shows that one can target the non-conditional inference by pointing
out that it is not part of the common ground. While this test is not a perfect test for
presuppositionality, it is definitely suggesting that the non-conditional inference here
is a presupposition.
(8) a. A: If John is in Berlin, he is happy that he went to Europe.
b. B: Hey, wait a minute. I didn’t know John went to Europe!
Moreover, the non-conditional inference projects out of questions as in (9a) and
antecedents of conditionals as in (9b). Again, this property is essential for an
inference to be classified as a presupposition.
(9) a. If John is in Berlin, is he happy that he went to Europe?
b. If John is in Berlin and he is happy that he went to Europe, he will be in
touch shortly.
c. (If John is in Berlin,) John went to Europe
Another response to the problem, suggested by van Rooij (2007) and Katzir & Singh
(2013), is to argue that examples like (4) and (5) would trigger the accommodation
of a question under discussion which itself carries a non-tautologous inference.
For instance, A’s question in (10a) presupposes that John went to Europe. There-
fore B will himself be taken to share that presupposition. In that case, however,
one cannot determine whether B’s utterance has a tautologous or non-tautologous
presupposition. Thus we cannot conclude anything about the presupposition of
(10b).
(10) a. A: Is John happy that he went to Europe?
b. B: If he is in Berlin, he is happy that he went to Europe.
We think, however, that this cannot be the whole story. Consider the conversation in
(11): B’s utterance is acceptable after a question that does not presuppose that John
is in Europe. Moreover, given the existence of an overt question, accommodation of
a further question under discussion with the called for presupposition is unlikely in
that situation. And crucially B’s utterance in (11) can still be taken to suggest that
John is in Europe.
(11) a. A: Tell me something about John. What is he doing this summer?
b. B: If he is in Berlin, he is happy that he went to Europe.
Summarizing, it seems that the non-conditional inferences of the examples in (4) and
(5) should be classified as presuppositions. And none of the approaches reviewed
above can account for this fact. Now, it must be noted that van der Sandt (1992),
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Geurts (1996) and Garcia-Odon (2012) offer DRT-accounts of examples similar
to the relevant ones above—that is, the facts just discussed are taken by them
as evidence that presupposition projection should be dealt with in a DRT-based
framework. Schlenker (2011), however, has raised various serious problems for such
an approach. For this reason, we explore an alternative solution to which we turn
now.
3 The account
3.1 Presuppositions and presupposition projection in trivalent semantics
3.1.1 Presuppositions in trivalent semantics
A trivalent system is based on three truth-values: 1, 0, and the third value #. A
non-complex sentence φp with p the presupposition of φ has the third value # in a
world w whenever p is 0 in w. For instance, assuming that the factive predicate in
(12) introduces the presupposition that John is in Europe, it should follow that (12)
is # in every world in which John is not in Europe.
(12) John regrets that he is in Europe.
Given this, we can define a notion of presupposition as follows in a trivalent system
(Beaver & Krahmer 2001), which has the desired consequence for (12):
(13) Presupposition in trivalent semantics
A sentence φ presupposes p iff ∀w : p(w) = 0→ JφK(w) = #.
From this definition of presupposition alone it does not follow that (12) is only
acceptable in contexts in which at least the speaker of the sentence takes John to
be in Europe. It turns out, however, that this can be guaranteed given a natural
pragmatic principle (see Beaver & Krahmer 2001; von Fintel 2008; Fox 2008).
According to Stalnaker (1979) a speaker asserting a sentence is taken to assume that
the sentence does not receive the third value in any world in the context. This is
known as the bridge principle—the bridge between compositional semantics and the
pragmatics of assertion:
(14) Stalnaker’s bridge principle
A sentence φp is assertable in context c iff ∀w ∈ c : JφK(w) 6= #.
In other words, the presupposition of a sentence φp can be seen as what it takes for
the sentence not to receive the third value. Given (14) it follows for (12) that its
speaker must assume that John is in Europe. For otherwise, he could not assert (12).
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3.1.2 Presupposition projection in Strong Kleene semantics
How does one determine the presuppositions of a complex sentence φ with subsen-
tence ψp? That is, how does the presupposition p of ψ project? As noted by Peters
(1979), Beaver & Krahmer (2001), Fox (2008), and George (2008) Strong Kleene
semantics gives largely adequate results. In such a system φ does not automatically
receive the third value # just because ψp does so. Rather, φ only receives # if a
standard bivalent system could not determine a bivalent truth-value regardless of
ψp’s third value.8 Consider the Strong Kleene truth-tables for the conditional and
the disjunction in (15).
(15)
→ 1 0 #
1 1 0 #
0 1 1 1
# 1 # #
∨ 1 0 #
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 #
# 1 # #
For a statement if φ , ψp it follows given the truth-table for the conditional connective
that the third-value of ψp only matters in case φ does not receive 0. The reason for
this is simple: in a bivalent semantics a conditional receives the value 1 as soon
as the antecedent is 0. As a consequence a Strong Kleene system assigns in this
case the value 1 to if φ , ψp even if ψp is #. If φ is 1, on the other hand, a bivalent
system cannot assign a value to the whole conditional. In case ψp is 1 the whole
is 1, and in case it is 0 the whole is 0. Given the definition of presupposition in
(13) it follows that if φ , ψp does not presuppose p because there are worlds where
p is 0 and if φ , ψp is not #. However, because of what has just been said if φ ,
ψp presupposes φ → p: whenever this proposition is 0, if φ , ψp is #. Given the
bridge principle in (14) it follows that if φ , ψp is only assertable in a context such
that if φ is 1, p is 1 too. So the speaker of if φ , ψp presupposes that for all w ∈ c,
φ(w) = 1→ p(w) = 1. It follows that both (16) and (17), repeated from above,
receive conditional presuppositions. As we know, this is desirable for the latter but
not necessarily for the former. Thus the Proviso Problem carries over to an account
of presupposition projection based on Strong Kleene semantics.
8 The results are adequate insofar as one restricts one’s attention to presuppositions contained in
the final subsentence linearly speaking. Here the standard Strong Kleene truth-tables make the
correct predictions regarding filtering of presuppositions. As noticed by Peters (1979) based on
Karttunen’s (1973) observations, however, presuppositions in non-final subsentences should not be
filtered. That is, the symmetry imposed by the Strong Kleene truth-tables should be broken. Peters
therefore proposes asymmetric Strong Kleene truth-tables. Fox (2008), building on Schlenker 2008,
shows that this is not necessary. One can use the standard Strong Kleene truth-tables provided one
incrementalizes the system by adopting Schlenker’s (2008) transparency-based system of pragmatic




(16) If John isn’t tired, he’ll read his Bible.
(17) If John is Catholic, he’ll read his Bible.
For completely parallel reasons the truth-table for disjunction in (15) together with
the bridge principle determines for a sentence ¬φ or ψp that the speaker presupposes
that if ¬φ is 0, p is 1. The reason for this is that only in case the first disjunct is
0 the truth-value of the second disjunct matters for determining the truth-value of
the whole disjunction under a bivalent semantics. Thus both (18) and (19) receive a
conditional presupposition. Again, this is only clearly desirable in the latter case.
(18) Either John is tired, or he’ll read his Bible.
(19) Either John isn’t Catholic, or he’ll read his Bible.
3.2 A novel observation about strengthening in Strong Kleene semantics
At this point it must be noted that the projection patterns in such a set-up are deter-
mined completely by the truth-tables for the connectives. Now, the Strong Kleene
truth-tables for the biconditional and the exclusive disjunction look as follows:
(20)
↔ 1 0 #
1 1 0 #
0 0 1 #
# # # #
O 1 0 #
1 0 1 #
0 1 0 #
# # # #
This has consequences for presupposition projection. Consider a sentence of the
form ifper f φ , ψp. In general in a bivalent system, a biconditional is 1 if and only
if the antecedent and the consequent have the same truth-value and 0 otherwise.
Therefore if ψp is #, a bivalent semantics can neither decide on a bivalent truth-value
for ifper f φ , ψp when φ is 1 nor when it is 0. In other words, in contrast to the
unidirectional conditional discussed in the preceding section, the truth-value of ψp
matters both in case φ is 1 and in case it is 0. Since this means that there are no
worlds in which p is 0 and ifper f φ , ψp receives a bivalent value, it follows that ifper f
φ , ψp presupposes p under the definition given above.
From this it follows that (16) and (17) read with a perfected interpretation of
the conditional presuppose that John has a Bible. As we know this is the desired
result for the former but not for the latter example. For (17) we do, however, have a
way of deriving the desired conditional presupposition—namely via a unidirectional
interpretation of the conditional as pointed out above.
A direct prediction of this is that an overtly biconditional version of (17) should
necessarily project the presupposition that John has a Bible. As mentioned when
discussing (3a), repeated in (21a), this prediction is borne out.
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(21) a. John is Catholic if and only if he will read his Bible.
b. John has a Bible
In parallel to the biconditional case, ¬φ orexcl ψp presupposes p given the truth-table
for exclusive disjunction in (20). In a bivalent system, an exclusive disjunction is 1
if and only if one disjunct is 1 and the other 0, and 0 otherwise. Because of this a
bivalent system cannot decide on a value for ¬φ or ψp if ψp is #. It thus follows that
(18) and (19) presuppose that John has a Bible if the disjunction is read exclusively.
Again, this is not clearly desirable in the latter case, but the inclusive interpretation
allows us to also predict a conditional presupposition.
In parallel to the prediction about (21a), it follows that an unquestionably exclu-
sive variant of (19) should presuppose that John has a Bible. It is more difficult to
determine whether this prediction is borne out. But (22a) seems to go in the right
direction, at least when compared to (19).
(22) a. Either John isn’t Catholic, or he’ll read his Bible, but not both.
b. ? John has a Bible
It should be pointed out that the predictions discussed also hold for theories of
presupposition projection based on the notion of transparency (Schlenker 2008,
2009). This is shown by Mayr & Romoli (2016), who also show that the predictions
are welcome not only for presupposition projection but also for a puzzle for theories
of redundancy in certain disjunctive sentences.
3.3 Accounting for the proviso cases
We have seen that a conditional and disjunctive sentence with a presupposition in
the final subsentence can be read as either projecting a conditional presupposition
or a non-conditional presupposition. Which presupposition is projected depends on
whether the connective is interpreted as strengthened or not. This truth-conditional
ambiguity between strengthened and non-strengthened interpretation, we claim, is at
the basis of the account of the Proviso Problem.
But why do the examples in (23) seemingly only have the unconditional pre-
supposition, which in our case means that the connectives must be interpreted as
strengthened? And why can the sentences in (24) have both presuppositions, which
for us means that the sentences are genuinely truth-conditionally ambiguous?
(23) a. If John isn’t tired, he’ll read his Bible.
b. Either John is tired, or he’ll read his Bible.
c. 6 If John isn’t tired, he has a Bible
d. John has a Bible
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(24) a. If John is Catholic, he’ll read his Bible.
b. Either John isn’t Catholic, or he’ll read his Bible.
c. If John is Catholic, he has a Bible
d. John has a Bible
We submit that the reason for the pattern in (23) and (24) is due to the fact that
not all theoretically possible interpretations are equally plausible. Consider first the
sentences in (23). When given a non-strengthened interpretation, we get a result
paraphrasable as in (25), but when read strengthened (26) follows. Here and in the
following the predicted presuppositions are underlined. The former presupposes that
John has a Bible if he isn’t tired and states that he will read it. This is generally less
plausible given real-world knowledge than the latter interpretation, which simply
presupposes that John has a Bible and states that he will read it if and only if he isn’t
tired. This is the reason why (26) is the accessible interpretation of (23).
(25) NON-STRENGTHENED (23): If John isn’t tired, he has a Bible and he’ll read
it if he isn’t tired.
(26) STRENGTHENED (23): John has a Bible and he’ll read his Bible if and only
if he isn’t tired.
For (24) the possible interpretations are as in (27) and (28). Here it turns out that
the conditional and the non-conditional presupposition are equally plausible given
real-world knowledge if no further information is provided. Thus both interpretations
should be available.
(27) NON-STRENGTHENED (24): If John is Catholic, he has a Bible and if he is
Catholic, he’ll read it.
(28) STRENGTHENED (24): John has a Bible and John will read his Bible if and
only if he is Catholic.
Thus the present account predicts the intuitive presuppositions available for con-
ditionals and disjunctions with presupposition triggers in the final subsentence
correctly. Notice that in contrast to other accounts of the Proviso Problem, the
plausibility measure just sketched is a general one not tied to the specific account. In
particular, the plausibility measure is the same that is at work at cases of genuine
ambiguity such as quantifier scope readings. It works over meanings as a whole and
not just presuppositions.
Finally, let us return to the examples in (29) and (30) once more. We showed
that standard accounts of the Proviso Problem predict them to have a tautologous
conditional presupposition, i.e., to be presuppositionless.
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(29) a. If John is in Berlin, he is happy that he went to Europe.
b. Either John isn’t in Berlin or he’s happy he went to Europe.
c. If John is in Berlin, John went to Europe
d. John went to Europe
(30) a. If all students left, the janitor didn’t realize that my best student left.
b. Either not all students left or the janitor didn’t realize that my best student
left.
c. If all students left, my best student left
d. My best student left
The present account, however, straightforwardly generates the intuitively available
non-conditional inferences for (29) and (30) as a presupposition. Consider, for
instance, the latter example. Similarly to (24) above both the strengthened and the
non-strengthened interpretations are plausible. Note in particular that since we do
not compare the presuppositions directly but rather the meanings as a whole, it does
not follow for us that the tautologous presupposition is chosen.
(31) NON-STRENGTHENED (30): If all students left, my best student left and if all
students left, the janitor didn’t realize that my best student left.
(32) STRENGTHENED (30): My best student left and the janitor didn’t realize that
my best student left if and only if all students left.
3.4 The account in more detail
How do the strengthened interpretations of conditionals and disjunctions come about?
For concreteness, following a wide-spread approach to the exclusive interpretation
of disjunction, we assume that this is done via the process of exhaustification. In
particular, we assume an exhaustivity operator which when applied to a prejacent
asserts it and negates its excludable alternatives (see Fox 2007; Chierchia, Fox &
Spector 2012 among many others). It is defined as in (33a). The set of excludable
alternatives is defined in (33b):9
(33) a. exh(A lt(p))(p)(w) = p(w)∧∀q ∈ E xcl(p,A lt(p))[¬q(w)]
b. E xcl(p,A lt(p)) ={
q ∈A lt(p) : p* q∧¬∃r[r ∈A lt(p)∧ (p∧¬q)⊆ r]}
9 The definition of excludable alternatives is a simplified one, which suffices for our present concerns.
For the more accurate definition see Fox 2007.
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Following among others Sauerland (2004) a disjunction of the form not-φ or ψ is
assumed to have the standard alternatives in (34). The exhaustivity operator will thus
negate the conjunctive alternative yielding an exclusive interpretation as in (35). The
remaining alternatives are not negated; for each it holds that the conjunction of its
negation with the prejacent entails the respective other alternative, which according
to (33b) blocks it from being in the set of excludable alternatives. From the exclusive
interpretation it follows under a Strong Kleene approach that presuppositions project
unfiltered from both disjuncts and in particular from the second disjunct, as discussed
above. This can be seen from (36).
(34) A lt(¬A∨B) =A lt(A→ B) = {¬A∨B,¬A,B,¬A∧B}
(35) exh(¬A∨B) = (¬A∨B)∧¬(¬A∧B)
(36) exh(A∨Bp) = exh(¬A→ Bp) = (A∨Bp)∧¬(A∧Bp) p
For simplicity, we assume that the conditional is interpreted as material implication
and that it is associated with the same alternatives as disjunction, as stated in (34).
From this it immediately follows that we make the same predictions as for disjunction
with regards to strengthening as given in (37). Moreover, we make therefore the
same predictions with regards to projection as can be seen from (38).
(37) exh(A→ B) = (A→ B)∧¬(¬A∧B) = (A→ B)∧ (B→ A)
(38) exh(A→ Bp) = (A→ Bp)∧¬(¬A∧Bp) = (A→ Bp)∧ (Bp→ A) p
Notice however that we need not necessarily make the assumption that disjunction
and conditional share their alternatives. For us any way of getting to the conditional
perfection interpretation will give rise to the desired projection property discussed
above. For instance, we could assume any account of conditional perfection among
Ducrot 1969; Matsumoto 1995; van der Auwera 1997; von Fintel 2001; Franke
2011; Herburger 2015 among others.
4 Other cases
In this section, we show that our account successfully extends to other aspects
of the Proviso Problem. We close with an open issue about cases in which the
non-conditional inference appears to arise obligatorily.
4.1 Factives
In addition to the original cases of proviso, Geurts (1996) also made the challenge
from the Proviso Problem more severe by pointing out that the conditional presuppo-
sition is never strengthened when it arises from other presuppositional environments,
regardless of considerations of plausibility. In particular, he shows that factive
14
Satisfied or exhaustified
sentences like (39a), the complement of which corresponds to the conditional pre-
supposition of the cases above, can only have the conditional presupposition in
(39b). That is, despite being implausible, (39b) can never be strengthened to the
non-conditional presupposition in (39c).
(39) a. Sue knows that if John isn’t tired, he has a Bible.
b. If John isn’t tired, he has a Bible
c. 6 John has a Bible
Sentences like (39a) are indeed a serious problem for the accounts discussed in
section 2.2. From their perspective, one would have to ask why accommodation of
(39c) is never possible when one faces (39a). On the present account this issue does
not arise. It is easy to show that neither global, (40a), nor local exhaustification,
(40b), can give rise to anything other than the conditional inference in (39b).
(40) a. exh[Sue knows that if John isn’t tired, he has a Bible]
b. Sue knows that exh[if John isn’t tired, he has a Bible]
More precisely, in (40a) exhaustification is vacuous and therefore the conditional
presupposition remains untouched. In (40b), the complement is locally strengthened
to a biconditional, so the presupposition of (39a) becomes a biconditional inference:
John isn’t tired if and only if he has a Bible. Crucially, however, the latter is not the
non-conditional inference that John has a Bible.
In sum, our proposal can straightforwardly account for the problem with factive
sentences like (39a) raised by Geurts (1996). In the next subsection, we turn to cases
of proviso involving quantifiers and we show that our approach has no problem
accounting for those either.
4.2 Quantifiers
Schlenker (2011) discusses cases of the Proviso Problem involving quantifiers like
(41a), giving rise to the non-conditional inference in (41b).10
(41) a. If I don’t give an exam, none of my students will realize that he is incom-
pentent.
b. Each of my students is incompetent
10 Schlenker (2011) shows that these data are problematic for DRT accounts. Essentially, the problem
for DRT-based accounts is that the presupposition is necessarily accommodated in the scope of the
quantifier. As a consequence, no inference such as (41b) can be projected contrary to intuition.
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Our approach can predict the presuppositional inference in (41b) if (41a) is ex-
haustified as in (42). Showing this would necessitate discussion of presupposition
projection from quantifier scopes, which we cannot include here for reasons of
space. Regardless of which presupposition is projected from the scope of the nega-
tive quantifier in (42), however, it should be clear that the perfected interpretation of
the conditional will directly project that presupposition to the root.
(42) exh[If I don’t give an exam, none of my students will realize that he is
incompentent]
4.3 Semi-conditional inferences
Another challenging aspect of the Proviso Problem comes from sentences like (43a),
embedding a conjunction in its antecedent. The problem is that (43a) tends to have
a ‘semi-conditional inference’ as in (43b)—that is, an inference the antecedent of
which corresponds to only one of the two conjuncts in the antecedent of the asserted
conditional. This is problematic for many of the accounts of the Proviso Problem
reviewed in section 2.2.
(43) a. If John is 64 and is aware of our hiring policies, he knows we cannot hire
him.
b. If John is 64, we cannot hire him
While semi-conditional inferences are challenging for our proposal as well, we can
derive them through contextual pruning of alternatives in the sense of Katzir (2007).
To illustrate, consider that among the alternatives for (43a) we have the following
two alternatives, obtained by simplifying the antecedent of the assertion to one of its
conjuncts.
(44) If John is 64, he knows we cannot hire him.
(45) If John is aware of our hiring policies, he knows we cannot hire him.
Now, if we allow the context to restrict the set of alternatives in such a way as to
include (44) but not (45), we end up with the following strengthened meaning for
(43a):
(46) If John is 64 and is aware of our hiring policies, he knows we cannot hire
him and it’s not true that if John is 64, he knows we cannot hire him.
It is easy to show that this reading of the sentence projects the presupposition in
(47), which is equivalent to the desired semi-conditional presupposition that if John
is 64, we cannot hire him.
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(47) If John is 64 and he is aware of our hiring policies, we cannot hire him and if
John is 64, we cannot hire him.
The prediction of this solution is that we link the particular reading in (46) with
the projection of the semi-conditional presupposition. We find the reading in (46)
indeed a natural reading of (43a). The judgment about whether the semi-conditional
inference is necessarily associated with this reading, however, is a delicate one and
we have to leave a more detailed investigation of this prediction to future work.
4.4 Obligatory non-conditional inferences
Mandelkern (2016b) has recently raised an important challenge to existing accounts
of the Proviso Problem and theories predicting conditional presuppositions more in
general (see also Mandelkern 2016a). In particular, he has argued that examples like
(48a) are infelicitous because of the non-conditional inference they would give rise
to—in this case the inference in (48c) that John has diabetes—which would clash
with the speaker asserted ignorance in the preceding context. The puzzling aspect
of examples like (48a) for accounts of Proviso is the apparent obligatoriness with
which this non-conditional inference would be derived, in spite of the infelicity of
the example. In other words, the question is why one cannot pragmatically select the
conditional inference in (48b), which would be consistent with the context of (48a).
(48) a. I don’t know if John has diabetes or arthrites, but . . .
#if he lowers his sugar intake at dinner tonight, his diabetes is under control.
b. If John lowers his sugar intake, he has diabetes
c. John has diabetes
This is a problem for all accounts that we know of. The challenge for our account
takes the form of why non-exhaustification of (48a) is apparently impossible. If the
infelicity of (48a) has as its source the non-conditional inference in (48c), we should
be able to avoid this by not exhaustifying (48a). Why is this not an option?
While exploring a full solution for this problem is beyond the scope of this paper,
we want to sketch an alternative direction to account for Mandelkern’s (2016b) data.
Here the alternative source of the oddness of (48a) would be that the latter is an
attempt to answer the salient Question Under Discussion—Does John have diabetes
or arthritis?—via a presupposition and this would independently be an infelicitous
discourse move. Crucially, this assumption predicts infelicity for (48a) regardless of
whether it is read with a conditional or a non-conditional inference. In either case,
we would be trying to answer the QUD with a presupposition.11 This explanation
11 Mandelkern (2016b) considers an account relying on the QUD in his fn. 20 when asking why the
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would not need to assume that the non-conditional inference is generated obligatorily
from (48a) at all.12
In sum, the data from Mandelkern (2016b) are challenging for accounts of
the Proviso Problem, including ours. The alternative explanation sketched above,
if ultimately viable, would allow us to maintain the general architecture of such
accounts, while explaining the infelicity of the examples above independently. We
leave a more detailed exploration of this for future work.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have put forward a proposal based on the observation that in certain
theories of presupposition projection exhaustification influences projection. As we
discussed, this provides a solution to data introduced by van der Sandt (1992) and
Geurts (1996), which are problematic for most theories of presuppositions in the
literature. In addition, the proposal can be extended to be a general solution to the
Proviso Problem. We have also discussed how the proposal can account for various
other instances of the problem, involving factives, quantifiers, and conditionals with
conjunctions in their antecedents.
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